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.TH tomb 1 "May 22, 2019" "tomb"
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.SH NAME
Tomb \- the Crypto Undertaker
.SH SYNOPSIS
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.B
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.IP "tomb [options] command [arguments]"
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.SH DESCRIPTION
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Tomb is an application to manage the creation and access of encrypted
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storage files: it can be operated from commandline and it can
integrate with a user's graphical desktop.
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Tomb generates encrypted storage files to be opened and closed using
their associated keys, which are also protected with a password chosen
by the user. To create, open and close tombs a user will need super
user rights to execute the tomb commandline utility.
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A tomb is like a locked folder that can be safely transported and
hidden in a filesystem; it encourages users to keep their keys
separate from tombs, for instance keeping a tomb file on your computer
harddisk and its key file on a USB stick.
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.SH COMMANDS
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.B
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.IP "dig"
Generates a file that can be used as a tomb and will occupy as much
space as its desired initial size, the unlocked \fI .tomb\fR file can
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then be locked using a \fI key\fR . It takes a mandatory \fI -s\fR option
which is the size in megabytes (MiB). Tombs are digged using random
data gathered from a non-blocking source (/dev/urandom).
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.B
.IP "forge"
Creates a new \fI key\fR and prompts the user for a \fI password\fR to
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protect its usage using symmetric encryption. This operation uses
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random data from a non-blocking source (/dev/urandom) and it may take
long only in some cases; to switch using a blocking source the
\fI --use-random\fR flag can be used. The \fI -g\fR option switches on
the use of a GPG key instead of a password (asymmetric encryption),
then the \fI -r\fR option indicates the recipient key; more recipient
GPG ids can be indicated (comma separated). The default cipher to
protect the key is AES256, a custom one can be specified using the
\fI -o\fR option, for a list of supported ciphers use \fI -v\fR . For
additional protection against dictionary attacks on keys, the
\fI --kdf\fR option can be used when forging a key, making sure that
the \fI tomb-kdb-pbkdf2\fR binaries in \fI extras/kdf\fR were compiled
and installed on the system.
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.B
.IP "lock"
Initializes and locks an empty tomb (made with \fI dig\fR ) using a key
(made with \fI forge\fR ), making it ready for usage. After this
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operation, the tomb can only be opened in possession of the key and
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knowing its password. As in any other command requiring a key, the
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option \fI -k\fR should be used to specify a key file; in case of
encryption to GPG recipients the \fI -g\fR flag should be used followed
by \fI -r\fR and the recipient's secret GPG key id. The \fI -o\fR
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option can be used to specify the cipher specification: default is
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"aes-xts-plain64", old versions of Tomb used
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"aes-cbc-essiv:sha256". If you are looking for something exotic, also
try "serpent-xts-plain64". More options may be found in cryptsetup(8)
and Linux documentation. This operation requires root privileges to
loopback mount, format the tomb (using LUKS and Ext4), then set the
key in its first LUKS slot.
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.B
.IP "open"
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Opens an existing \fI tomb file\fR (first argument) using a key
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(\fI -k\fR ) which can also be hidden inside a \fI jpeg image\fR (see
\fI bury\fR /\fI exhume\fR ) or a long text file
(see\fI cloak\fR /\fI uncloak\fR ). If a second argument is given it will
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indicate the \fI mountpoint\fR where the tomb should be made
accessible, else the tomb is mounted in a directory inside /media (if
not available it uses /run/media/$USER). The option \fI -o\fR can be
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used to pass mount(8) options (default: rw,noatime,nodev). The
\fI -g\fR option is needed when using GPG encryption to recipients.
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.B
.IP "list"
List all the tombs found open, including information about the time
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they were opened and the hooks that they mounted. If the first
argument is present, then shows only the tomb named that way or
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returns an error if it's not found. If the option
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\fI --get-mountpoint\fR is used then print a simple list of currently
open tomb mountpoint paths.
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.B
.IP "ps"
List all the processes found running inside the tombs that are open,
printing out their PIDs and owners. This is useful to have an overview
of programs that are keeping the tombs busy and would eventually be
killed by the \fI slam\fR command. The lsof(8) utility is used
internally to enumerate processes running in one or all tombs.
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.B
.IP "index"
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Creates or updates the search indexes of all tombs currently open:
enables use of the \fI search\fR command using simple word patterns on
file names. Indexes are created using mlocate's updatedb(8) and
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swish-e(1) if they are found on the system. Indexes allow one to search
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very fast for filenames and contents inside a tomb, they are stored
inside it and are not accessible if the Tomb is closed. To avoid
indexing a specific tomb simply touch a \fI .noindex\fR file in it.
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.B
.IP "search"
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Takes any string as argument and searches for them through all tombs
currently open and previously indexed using the \fI index\fR command.
The search matches filenames if mlocate is installed and then also
file contents if swish++ is present on the system, results are listed
on the console.
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.B
.IP "close"
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Closes a currently open tomb. If more tombs are open, the first
argument should be used to specify the name of the tomb to be closed,
or \fI all\fR to close all currently open tombs. This command fails if
the tomb is in use by running processes (to force close, see
\fI slam\fR below).
.B
.IP "slam"
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Closes a tomb like the command \fI close\fR does, but it doesn't fail
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even if the tomb is in use by other application processes: it looks
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for and closes each of them (in order: TERM, HUP, KILL). This command may
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provoke unsaved data loss, but assists users to face surprise
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situations. It requires \fI lsof\fR else it falls back to \fI close\fR .
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.B
.IP "passwd"
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Changes the password protecting a key file specified using
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\fI -k\fR . With keys encrypted for GPG recipients use \fI -g\fR followed
by \fI -r\fR to indicate the new recipient key, or a comma separated
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list.. The user will need to know the key's current password, or
possess at least one of the current recipients GPG secret keys,
because the key contents will be decoded and reencoded using the new
passwords or keys. If the key file is broken (missing headers) this
function also attempts its recovery.
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.B
.IP "setkey"
Changes the key file that locks a tomb, substituting the old one with
a new one. Both the old and the new key files are needed for this
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operation and their passwords or GPG recipient(s) secret keys must be
available. The new key must be specified using the \fI -k\fR option,
the first argument should be the old key and the second and last
argument the tomb file. Use the \fI -g\fR option to unlock the tomb
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with a GPG key, the \fI -r\fR to indicate the recipient or a comma
separated list for more than one recipient.
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.B
.IP "resize"
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Increase the size of a tomb file to the amount specified by the
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\fI -s\fR option, which is the new size in megabytes (MiB). Full access
to the tomb using a key (\fI -k\fR ) and its password is required. Tombs
can only grow and can never be made smaller. This command makes use of
the cryptsetup(8) resize feature and the resize2fs command: its much
more practical than creating a new tomb and moving everything into
it. There is no data-loss if a failure occurs during resize: the
command can be re-launched and the resize operation will complete.
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.B
.IP "engrave"
This command transforms a tomb key into an image that can be printed
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on paper and physically stored as backup, i.e. hidden in a book. It
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Renders a QRCode of the tomb key, still protected by its password: a
PNG image (extension \fI .qr.png\fR ) will be created in the current
directory and can be later printed (fits an A4 or Letter format). To
recover an engraved key one can use any QRCode reader on a smartphone:
save it into a file and then use that file as a key (\fI -k\fR ).
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.B
.IP "bury"
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Hides a tomb key (\fI -k\fR ) inside a \fI jpeg image\fR (first argument)
using \fI steganography\fR : the image will change in a way that cannot
be noticed by human eye and hardly detected by data analysis. This
option is useful to backup tomb keys in unsuspected places; it depends
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from the availability of \fI steghide\fR . Use the \fI -g\fR flag and
\fI -r\fR option followed by recipient id to use GPG asymmetric
encryption.
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.B
.IP "exhume"
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This command recovers from jpeg images the keys that were previously
hidden into them using \fI bury\fR . Exhume requires a key filename
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(\fI -k\fR ) and a \fI jpeg image\fR file (first argument) known to be
containing a key. If the right key password is given, the key will be
exhumed. If the password is not known, it is very hard to verify if a
key is buried in any image or not.
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.B
.IP "cloak"
Hides a tomb key (\fI -k\fR ) inside a \fI long plain-text file\fR (first
argument) using \fI steganography\fR : the text will change in a way
that can hardly be noticed by human eye and hardly detected by data
analysis. This option is useful to backup tomb keys in unsuspected
places; it depends from the availability of \fI cloakify\fR and
consequently \fI python2\fR . This function does not support asymmetric
encryption using the \fI -g\fR flag.
.B
.IP "uncloak"
This command recovers from long plain-text files the keys that were
previously hidden into them using \fI cloak\fR . Cloak requires a key
filename (\fI -k\fR ) and a \fI plain-text\fR file (first argument) known
to be containing a key. If the right key password is given, the key
will be exhumed. If the password is not known, it is quite hard to
verify if a key is buried in a text or not.
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.SH OPTIONS
.B
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.B
.IP "-k \fI<keyfile>\fR"
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For all operations requiring a key, this option specifies the location
of the key file to use. Arguments can also be \fI jpeg image\fR files
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where keys have been hidden using the \fI bury\fR or \fI cloak\fR
commands, or text files retrieved from \fI engraved\fR QR codes. If the
\fI keyfile\fR argument is "-" (dash), Tomb will read the key from
stdin (blocking).
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.B
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.IP "-n"
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Skip processing of exec-hooks and bind-hooks if found inside the tomb.
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See the \fI HOOKS\fR section in this manual for more information.
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.B
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.IP "-p"
When opening a tomb, preserves the ownership of all files and
directories contained in it. Normally the \fI open\fR command changes
the ownership of a tomb's contents to the UID and GID of the user who
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has successfully opened it: it is a usability feature in case a tomb is
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used by a single user across different systems. This flag deactivates
this behaviour.
.B
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.IP "-o"
Manually specify mount options to be used when opening a tomb instead
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of the default \fI rw,noatime,nodev\fR , i.e. to mount a tomb read-only
(ro) to prevent any modification of its data. Can also be used to
change the symmetric encryption algorithm for keys during \fI forge\fR
operations (default \fI AES256\fR ) or the LUKS encryption method during
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\fI lock\fR operations (default \fI aes-xts-plain64\fR ).
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.B
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.IP "-f"
Force flag, currently used to override swap checks, might be
overriding more wimpy behaviours in future, but make sure you know
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what you are doing if you force an operation.
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.B
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.IP "-s \fI<MBytes>\fR"
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When digging or resizing a tomb, this option must be used to specify
the \fI size\fR of the new file to be created. Units are megabytes (MiB).
.B
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.IP "-g"
Tell tomb to use a asymmetric GnuPG key encryption instead of a
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symmetric passphrase to protect a tomb key. This option can be followed by \fI -r\fR when the command needs to specify recipient(s).
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.B
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.IP "-r \fI<gpg_id>[,<gpg_id2>]\fR"
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Provide a new set of recipient(s) to encrypt a tomb key. \fI gpg_ids\fR
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can be one or more GPG key ID, comma separated. All GPG keys must be
trusted keys in GPG.
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.B
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.IP "--kdf \fI<itertime>\fR"
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Activate the KDF feature against dictionary attacks when creating a
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key: forces a delay of \fI <itertime>\fR times every time this key is
used. The actual time to wait depends on the CPU speed of the
computer where the key is used. Using 5 or 10 is a sane amount for
modern computers, the value is multiplied by 1 million.
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.B
.IP "--sphx-user \fI<username>\fR"
Activate the SPHINX feature for password-authenticated key agreement.
This option indicates the \fI <username>\fR used to retrieve the
password from a sphinx oracle key reachable via TCP/IP.
.IP "--sphx-host \fI<domain>\fR"
Activate the SPHINX feature for password-authenticated key agreement.
This option indicates the \fI <domain>\fR used to retrieve the password
from a sphinx oracle daemon reachable via TCP/IP. This is not the
network address of the daemon, which is configured in /etc/sphinx
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.B
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.IP "-h"
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Display a help text and quit.
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.B
.IP "-v"
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Display version and quit.
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.B
.IP "-q"
Run more quietly
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.B
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.IP "-D"
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Print more information while running, for debugging purposes
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.SH DEV MODE
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.B
.IP "--no-color"
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Suppress colors in console output (needed for string parsing by
wrappers).
.B
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.IP "--unsafe"
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Enable using dev-mode arguments, i.e. to pass passwords from
commandline options. This is mostly used needed for execution by
wrappers and testing suite.
.B
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.IP "--use-random"
Use a blocking random source. Tomb uses by default /dev/urandom since
the non-blocking source of Linux kernel doesn't degrades the quality
of random.
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.B
.IP "--tomb-pwd <string>"
Use string as password when needed on tomb.
.B
.IP "--tomb-old-pwd <string>"
Use string as old password when needed in tomb commands requiring
multiple keys, like \fI passwd\fR or \fI setkey\fR .
.B
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.IP "-U"
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Switch to this user ID when dropping privileges.
.B
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.IP "-G"
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Switch to this group ID when dropping privileges.
.B
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.IP "-T"
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Switch to this TTY terminal when dropping privileges.
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.SH HOOKS
Hooks are special files that can be placed inside the tomb and trigger
actions when it is opened and closed; there are two kinds of such
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files: \fI bind-hooks\fR and \fI exec-hooks\fR can be placed in the
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base root of the tomb.
.B
.IP "bind-hooks"
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This hook file consists of a simple text file named \fI bind-hooks\fR
containing a two column list of paths to files or directories inside
the tomb. The files and directories will be be made directly
accessible by the tomb \fI open\fR command inside the current user's
home directory. Tomb uses internally the "mount \- o bind" command to
bind locations inside the tomb to locations found in $HOME. In the
first column are indicated paths relative to the tomb and in the
second column are indicated paths relative to $HOME contents, for
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example:
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.EX
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mail mail
.gnupg .gnupg
.fmrc .fetchmailrc
.mozilla .mozilla
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.EE
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.B
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.IP "exec-hooks"
This hook file gets executed as user by tomb with the first argument
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determining the step of execution (\fI open\fR or \fI close\fR ) and the second
being the full path to the mountpoint. The \fI exec-hooks\fR file should be
executable (ELF or shell script) and present inside the Tomb. Tomb
executes this hook as user and adds the name, loopback device and
dev-mapper device paths as additional arguments for the \fI close\fR
command.
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.SH PRIVILEGE ESCALATION
The tomb commandline tool needs to acquire super user rights to
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execute most of its operations: to do so it uses sudo(8), while
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pinentry(1) is adopted to collect passwords from the user. Tomb
executes as super user only when required.
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To be made available on multi user systems, the superuser execution of
the tomb script can be authorized for users without jeopardizing the
whole system's security: just add such a line to \fI /etc/sudoers\fR :
.EX
username ALL=NOPASSWD: /usr/local/bin/tomb
.EE
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To avoid that tomb execution is logged by \fI syslog\fR also add:
.EX
Cmnd_Alias TOMB = /usr/local/bin/tomb
Defaults!TOMB !syslog
.EE
.SH PASSWORD INPUT
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Password input is handled by the pinentry program: it can be text
based or graphical and is usually configured with a symlink. When
using Tomb in X11 it is better to use a graphical pinentry-gtk2 or
pinentry-qt because it helps preventing keylogging by other X
clients. When using it from a remote ssh connection it might be
necessary to force use of pinentry-curses for instance by unsetting
the DISPLAY environment var.
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.SH SWAP
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On execution of certain commands Tomb will complain about swap memory
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on disk when present and \fI abort if your system has swap
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activated\fR . You can disable this behaviour using the
\fI --force\fR . Before doing that, however, you may be interested in
knowing the risks of doing so:
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.IP \(bu
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During such operations a lack of available memory could cause the swap
to write your secret key on the disk.
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.IP \(bu
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Even while using an opened tomb, another application could occupy too
much memory so that the swap needs to be used, this way it is possible
that some contents of files contained into the tomb are physically
written on your disk, not encrypted.
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.P
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If you don't need swap, execute \fI swapoff -a\fR . If you really need
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it, you could make an encrypted swap partition. Tomb doesn't detect if
your swap is encrypted, and will complain anyway.
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.SH DENIABILITY
The possibility to have an encrypted volume which is invisible and
cannot be detected is called "deniability". The cryptographic layer of
the device mapper in Linux (dm-crypt) does not implement
deniability. Tomb is just a wrapper on top of that and it doesn't add
cryptographic deniability. However a certain way of using tomb can
facilitate a weak sort of deniability outside of the scenario of
seized devices and forensic analysis of files and blocks on disc.
For instance to eliminate any trace of tomb usage from the shell
history ZSh users can activate the "HISTIGNORESPACE" feature and
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prefix all invocations of tomb with a blank space, including two lines
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in ".zshrc":
.EX
export HISTIGNORESPACE=1
alias tomb=' tomb'
.EE
.SH PASSWORD INPUT
Tomb uses the external program "pinentry" to let users type the key password into a terminal or a graphical window. This program works in conjunction with "gpg-agent", a daemon running in background to facilitate secret key management with gpg. It is recommended one runs "gpg-agent" launching it from the X session initialization ("~/.xsession" or "~/.xinitrc" files) with this command:
.EX
eval $(gpg-agent --daemon --write-env-file "${HOME}/.gpg-agent-info")
.EE
In the future it may become mandatory to run gpg-agent when using tomb.
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.SH SHARE A TOMB
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A tomb key can be encrypted with more than one recipient. Therefore, a
tomb can be shared between different users. The recipients are given
using the \fI -r\fR (or/and \fI -R\fR ) option and if multiple each GPG
key ID must be separated by a comma (\fI ,\fR ). Sharing a tomb is a
very sensitive action and the user needs to trust that all the GPG
public keys used are kept safe. If one of them its stolen or lost, it
will be always possible to use it to access the tomb key unless all
its copies are destroyed. The \fI -r\fR option can be used in the tomb
commands: \fI open\fR , \fI forge\fR \fI setkey\fR , \fI passwd\fR ,
\fI bury\fR , \fI exhume\fR and \fI resize\fR .
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.SH SPHINX (PAKE)
Using the package libsphinx
.UR https://github.com/stef/libsphinx
.UE
and its python client/daemon implementation pwdsphinx
.UR https://github.com/stef/pwdsphinx
.UE
is possible to store and retrieve safely the password that locks the
tomb. Using this feature will make it impossible to retrieve the
password without the oracle sphinx server running and reachable. Each
key entry needs a username and a domain specified on creation and
a password that locks it.
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SPHINX makes it impossible to maliciously retrieve the password
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locking the tomb key without an attacker accessing both the
server, the sphinx password and the tomb key file.
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.SH EXAMPLES
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.IP \(bu
Create a 128MB large "secret" tomb and its keys, then open it:
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.EX
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tomb dig -s 128 secret.tomb
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tomb forge secret.tomb.key
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tomb lock secret.tomb -k secret.tomb.key
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tomb open secret.tomb -k secret.tomb.key
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.EE
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2013-06-12 12:10:27 +00:00
.IP \(bu
Open a Tomb using the key from a remote SSH shell, without saving any
local copy of it:
.EX
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ssh user@my.shell.net 'cat .secrets/tomb.key' | tomb open secret.tomb -k -
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.EE
2014-11-14 19:23:16 +00:00
.IP \(bu
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Open a Tomb on a remote server passing the unencrypted local key on stdin via SSH,
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without saving any remote copy of it:
.EX
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gpg -d .secrets/tomb.key | ssh server tomb open secret.tomb -k cleartext --unsafe
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.EE
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.IP \(bu
Create a bind hook that places your GnuPG folder inside the tomb, but
makes it reachable from the standard $HOME/.gnupg location every time
the tomb will be opened:
.EX
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tomb open GPG.tomb -k GPG.tomb.key
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echo ".gnupg .gnupg" > /media/GPG.tomb/bind-hooks
mv ~/.gnupg /media/GPG.tomb/.gnupg && mkdir ~/.gnupg
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tomb close GPG && tomb open GPG.tomb -k GPG.tomb.key
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.EE
.IP \(bu
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Script a tomb to launch the Firefox browser every time is opened,
keeping all its profile data inside it:
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.EX
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tomb open FOX.tomb -k FOX.tomb.key
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cat <<EOF > /media/FOX.tomb/exec-hooks
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#!/bin/sh
if [ "$1" = "open" ]; then
firefox -no-remote -profile "$2"/firefox-pro &
fi
EOF
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chmod +x /media/FOX.tomb/exec-hooks
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mkdir /media/FOX.tomb/firefox-pro
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.EE
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2013-09-19 13:37:21 +00:00
.IP \(bu
Script a tomb to archive Pictures using Shotwell, launching it on open:
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.EX
tomb open Pictures.tomb -k Pictures.tomb.key
cat <<EOF > /media/Pictures.tomb/bind-hooks
Pictures Pictures
EOF
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cat <<EOF > /media/Pictures.tomb/exec-hooks
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#!/bin/sh
if [ "$1" = "open" ]; then
which shotwell > /dev/null
if [ "$?" = "0" ]; then
shotwell -d "$2"/Pictures/.shotwell &
fi
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fi
EOF
2020-02-04 14:07:08 +00:00
chmod +x /media/Pictures.tomb/exec-hooks
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.EE
2011-01-26 15:00:40 +00:00
.SH BUGS
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Please report bugs on the Github issue tracker at
.UR https://github.com/dyne/Tomb/issues
2011-08-31 15:15:23 +00:00
.UE
2017-01-02 11:02:23 +00:00
One can also try to get in touch with developers via the #dyne chat
channel on \fI https://irc.dyne.org\fR .
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.SH COPYING
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This manual is Copyright (c) 2011-2019 by Denis Roio <\fI jaromil@dyne.org\fR >
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2015-06-24 21:33:21 +00:00
This manual includes contributions by Boyska and Hellekin O. Wolf.
2011-09-27 10:16:19 +00:00
2011-01-26 15:00:40 +00:00
Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this manual
under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License, Version 1.1 or
any later version published by the Free Software Foundation.
Permission is granted to make and distribute verbatim copies of this
manual page provided the above copyright notice and this permission
notice are preserved on all copies.
.SH AVAILABILITY
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The most recent version of Tomb sourcecode and up to date
documentation is available for download from its website on
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\fI https://tomb.dyne.org\fR .
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.SH SEE ALSO
.B
.IP cryptsetup(8)
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.B
.IP pinentry(1)
.B
.IP gpg-agent(1)
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2017-01-02 11:02:23 +00:00
GnuPG website: https://www.gnupg.org
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2017-01-02 11:02:23 +00:00
DM-Crypt website: https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMCrypt
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2017-01-02 11:02:23 +00:00
LUKS website: https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/home