tomb doesn't need lsof for anything else, and can work regulary without it.
So make it an optional feature, which allows to slam a tomb if lsof is installed
Updates additionally the man page and generates a new pdf from it
The -r option always requires an arguments. However GPG does not need
any recipient when decrypting a key. In order to be able to open a tomb
without writing (the long) recipient, the user can use the -f option to
short-cut the valid recipient checking. A dummy recipient is still required.
Sharing feature is a very sensitive action, the user needs to trust the
GPG public key it is going to share its tomb. This is why this feature
needs to be explicitly activated using in more the flag --shared
on the key encryption commands.
A tomb key can be encrypted with more than one recipient. Therefore, a
tomb can be shared between different user. The multiple recipients are
given using the -r (or/and -R) option and must be separated by ','.
Multiple recipients can be given for the commands: forge, setket and passwd
Decryption/Encryption works without these improvment, however, there
are needed in order to have clean key (without empty line).
Moreover, tests showed not doing cause troubles when changing the GPG key
used to encrypt a tomb key.
The tomb policy is to use the same password to encrypt
the key and to bury it. However, steganography cannot be
done with GPG key. Therefore, we check the user can
decrypt the tomb with its GPG key and we ask for a
steganography password. Having different method is a
technical requirement and should enhance security.
Apparantly fuser didn't report back, if the tomb was mounted in a subdir of /run (whereas /run itself is often a tmpfs mount).
With no list of process ids those couldn't be killed, so slamming the tomb failed.
lsof is capable to report back the sought information.
Fixes#220
Additionally fixing the debug output, where a hardcoded mountpoint was used
Addresses issue #238: as 512 bit key length triggers use of AES256.
Apparently so far tombs used AES128 due to key length 256.
Change passes all tests and has no regression implications.
The chmod/chown launched on the mounted volume is not really effective
for security, plus the UID is not correctly guessed when tomb is
launched using sudo. It is now up to the user to correctly set
ownership and permission on mounted volumes. There is also one less
check on the ownership of the tomb file which was failing with a
warning in the same case.
