Various PDF digital signing tools do not encrypt /Contents value in
signature dictionary. Adobe Acrobat Reader DC can handle a PDF with
the /Contents value not encrypted.
Write Contents in signature dictionary without encryption
Tests ensure that string /Contents are not handled specially when not
found in sig dicts.
* Several assertions in linearization were not always true; change
them to run time errors
* Handle a few cases of uninitialized objects
* Handle pages with no contents when doing form operations
* Handle invalid page tree nodes when traversing pages
This makes all integer type conversions that have potential data loss
explicit with calls that do range checks and raise an exception. After
this commit, qpdf builds with no warnings when -Wsign-conversion
-Wconversion is used with gcc or clang or when -W3 -Wd4800 is used
with MSVC. This significantly reduces the likelihood of potential
crashes from bogus integer values.
There are some parts of the code that take int when they should take
size_t or an offset. Such places would make qpdf not support files
with more than 2^31 of something that usually wouldn't be so large. In
the event that such a file shows up and is valid, at least qpdf would
raise an error in the right spot so the issue could be legitimately
addressed rather than failing in some weird way because of a silent
overflow condition.
Add a version of expectInlineImage that takes an input source and
searches for EI. This is in preparation for improving the way EI is
found. This commit just refactors the code without changing the
functionality and adds tests to make sure the old and new code behave
identically.
Instead of directly putting the contents of the annotation appearance
streams into the page's content stream, add commands to render the
form xobjects directly. This is a more robust way to do it than the
original solution as it works properly with patterns and avoids
problems with resource name clashes between the pages and the form
xobjects.
If parsing content streams is treated as a warning, there is no way
for a caller to know if a parsing operation has failed. This is very
dangerous and will likely result in data loss when token filters are
parser callbacks are in use.
It's not really a shallow copy. It just doesn't cross indirect object
boundaries. The old implementation had a bug that would cause multiple
shallow copies of the same object to share memory, which was not the
intention.
Remove calls to assertPageObject(). All cases in the library that
called assertPageObject() work fine if you don't call
assertPageObject() because nothing assumes anything that was being
checked by that call. Removing the calls enables more files to be
successfully processed.
