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Update docs according to comments from MichaelEischer in PR #3656
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@ -319,9 +319,8 @@ four Sundays, but remove the rest:
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8 snapshots
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8 snapshots
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The result of the ``forget --keep-daily`` operation only partially depends on
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The result of the ``forget --keep-daily`` operation only partially depends on
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when it is run; it will only count the days for which a snapshot exists,
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when it is run, counting only the days for which a snapshot exists.
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although snapshots with a `time` lying in the future are ignored and never
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This is a safety feature: it prevents restic from removing snapshots
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removed. This is a safety feature: it prevents restic from removing snapshots
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when no new ones are created. Otherwise, running ``forget --keep-daily 4`` on
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when no new ones are created. Otherwise, running ``forget --keep-daily 4`` on
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a Friday (without any snapshot Monday to Thursday) would remove all snapshots!
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a Friday (without any snapshot Monday to Thursday) would remove all snapshots!
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@ -346,6 +345,10 @@ could specify:
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Security considerations in append-only mode
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Security considerations in append-only mode
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===========================================
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===========================================
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.. note:: TL;DR: append-only repositories should use the ``--keep-within``
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option. This will allow you to notice problems with the backup or the
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compromised host during the specified duration.
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To prevent a compromised backup client from deleting its backups (for example
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To prevent a compromised backup client from deleting its backups (for example
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due to a ransomware infection), a repository service/backend can serve the
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due to a ransomware infection), a repository service/backend can serve the
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repository in a so-called append-only mode. This means that the repository can
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repository in a so-called append-only mode. This means that the repository can
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@ -358,23 +361,24 @@ standard backends do. To support append-only with such a backend, one can use
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.. _rclone: https://rclone.org/commands/rclone_serve_restic/
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.. _rclone: https://rclone.org/commands/rclone_serve_restic/
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To remove snapshots and recover the corresponding disk space, the ``forget``
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To remove snapshots and recover the corresponding disk space, the ``forget``
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and ``prune`` commands must have full read, write and delete access to the
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and ``prune`` commands require full read, write and delete access to the
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repository. If an attacker has this, the protection offered by append-only
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repository. If an attacker has this, the protection offered by append-only
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mode is naturally void.
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mode is naturally void.
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However, even with append-only mode active, an attacker who is able to add
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However, even with append-only mode active, an attacker who is able to add
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additional and empty or otherwise useless snapshots to the repository can
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garbage snapshots to the repository could bring the snapshot list into a state
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potentially cause a situation where a trusted client running ``forget`` with
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where all legitimate snapshots are deleted by a client with full access. By
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certain ``--keep-*`` options might unknowingly remove legitimate snapshots,
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running ``forget`` with certain ``--keep-*`` options as repository
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leaving only the attackers useless snapshots.
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administrator, legitimate snapshots might be unknowingly removed, leaving only
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the attacker's useless snapshots.
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For example, if the ``forget`` policy is to keep three weekly snapshots, and
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For example, if the ``forget`` policy is to keep three weekly snapshots, and
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the attacker adds an empty snapshot for each of the last three weeks, all with
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the attacker adds an empty snapshot for each of the last three weeks, all with
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a timestamp (see the ``backup`` command's ``-`time`` option) slightly more
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a timestamp (see the ``backup`` command's ``--time`` option) slightly more
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recent than the existing snapshots (but still within the target week), then the
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recent than the existing snapshots (but still within the target week), then the
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next time the repository administrator (or scheduled job) runs the ``forget``
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next time the repository administrator (or a scheduled job) runs the ``forget``
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command with this policy, the legitimate snapshots will be removed (since the
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command with this policy, the legitimate snapshots will be removed (since the
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policy will use the most recent snapshot within each week). Even without
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policy will keep only the most recent snapshot within each week). Even without
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running ``prune``, recovering data would be messy and some metadata lost.
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running ``prune``, recovering data would be messy and some metadata lost.
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To avoid this, ``forget`` policies applied to append-only repositories should
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To avoid this, ``forget`` policies applied to append-only repositories should
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@ -632,7 +632,7 @@ system making backups could:
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and wait until a trusted host has used ``forget`` often enough to remove all
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and wait until a trusted host has used ``forget`` often enough to remove all
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correct snapshots.
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correct snapshots.
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- Create a garbage snapshot for every existing snapshot with a slightly
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- Create a garbage snapshot for every existing snapshot with a slightly
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different timestamp and wait until certain ``forget`` configurations has been
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different timestamp and wait until certain ``forget`` configurations have been
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run, thereby removing all correct snapshots at once.
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run, thereby removing all correct snapshots at once.
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An adversary with write access to your files at the storage location could:
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An adversary with write access to your files at the storage location could:
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@ -666,5 +666,6 @@ An adversary who has a leaked (decrypted) key for a repository could:
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same repository, an attacker will get access to the backup data of every host.
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same repository, an attacker will get access to the backup data of every host.
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Note that since the local encryption key gives access to the master key, a
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Note that since the local encryption key gives access to the master key, a
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password change will not prevent this. Changing the master key can currently
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password change will not prevent this. Changing the master key can currently
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be done using the ``copy`` command, which moves the data into a new repository
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only be done using the ``copy`` command, which moves the data into a new
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with a new master key, or by making a completely new repository and new backup.
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repository with a new master key, or by making a completely new repository
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and new backup.
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