2015-12-20 09:05:17 +00:00
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.\" Man page generated from reStructuredText.
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2018-08-01 05:45:28 +00:00
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.TH "SYNCTHING-RELAY" "7" "Jul 28, 2018" "v0.14" "Syncthing"
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2015-12-20 09:05:17 +00:00
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.SH NAME
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syncthing-relay \- Relay Protocol v1
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.
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.nr rst2man-indent-level 0
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.de1 rstReportMargin
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\\$1 \\n[an-margin]
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level \\n[rst2man-indent-level]
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level margin: \\n[rst2man-indent\\n[rst2man-indent-level]]
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-
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\\n[rst2man-indent0]
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\\n[rst2man-indent1]
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\\n[rst2man-indent2]
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..
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.de1 INDENT
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.\" .rstReportMargin pre:
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. RS \\$1
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. nr rst2man-indent\\n[rst2man-indent-level] \\n[an-margin]
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. nr rst2man-indent-level +1
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.\" .rstReportMargin post:
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..
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.de UNINDENT
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. RE
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.\" indent \\n[an-margin]
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.\" old: \\n[rst2man-indent\\n[rst2man-indent-level]]
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.nr rst2man-indent-level -1
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.\" new: \\n[rst2man-indent\\n[rst2man-indent-level]]
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.in \\n[rst2man-indent\\n[rst2man-indent-level]]u
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..
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.SH WHAT IS A RELAY?
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.sp
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Relay is a service which relays data between two \fIdevices\fP which are not able to
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connect to each other directly otherwise. This is usually due to both devices
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being behind a NAT and neither side being able to open a port which would
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be directly accessible from the internet.
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.sp
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2017-11-29 06:45:17 +00:00
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A relay was designed to relay BEP protocol, hence the reliance on device ID’s
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in the protocol spec, but at the same time it is general enough that could be
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reused by other protocols or applications, as the data transferred between two
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devices which use a relay is completely obscure and does not affect the
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relaying.
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.SH OPERATION MODES
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.sp
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Relay listens on a single TCP socket, but has two different connection modes,
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where a connection mode is a predefined set of messages which the relay and
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the device are expecting to exchange.
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.sp
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The first mode is the \fIprotocol\fP mode which allows a client to interact
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with the relay, for example join the relay, or request to connect to a device,
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given it is available on the relay. Similarly to BEP, protocol mode requires
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the device to connect via TLS using a strong suite of ciphers (same as BEP),
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which allows the relay to verify and derive the identity (Device ID) of the
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device.
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.sp
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The second mode is the \fIsession\fP mode which after a few initial messages
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connects two devices directly to each other via the relay, and is a plain\-text
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protocol, which for every byte written by one device, sends the same set of
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bytes to the other device and vica versa.
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.SH IDENTIFYING THE CONNECTION MODE
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.sp
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Because both connection modes operate over the same single socket, a method
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of detecting the connection mode is required.
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.sp
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When a new client connects to the relay, the relay checks the first byte
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that the client has sent, and if that matches 0x16, that implies to us that
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the connection is a protocol mode connection, due to 0x16 being the first byte
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in the TLS handshake, and only protocol mode connections use TLS.
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.sp
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If the first byte is not 0x16, then we assume that the connection is a session
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mode connection.
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.SH PROTOCOL MODE
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.sp
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Protocol mode uses TLS and protocol name defined by the TLS header should be
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\fIbep\-relay\fP\&.
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.sp
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Protocol mode has two submodes:
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1. Permanent protocol submode \- Joining the relay, and waiting for messages from
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the relay asking to connect to some device which is interested in having a
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session with you.
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2. Temporary protocol submode \- Only used to request a session with a device
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which is connected to the relay using the permanent protocol submode.
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.SS Permanent protocol submode
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.sp
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A permanent protocol submode begins with the client sending a JoinRelayRequest
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message, which the relay responds to with either a ResponseSuccess or
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ResponseAlreadyConnected message if a client with the same device ID already
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exists.
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.sp
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After the client has joined, no more messages are exchanged apart from
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Ping/Pong messages for general connection keep alive checking.
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.sp
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2017-11-29 06:45:17 +00:00
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From this point onwards, the client stand\-by’s and waits for SessionInvitation
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messages from the relay, which implies that some other device is trying to
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connect with you. SessionInvitation message contains the unique session key
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which then can be used to establish a connection in session mode.
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.sp
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If the client fails to send a JoinRelayRequest message within the first ping
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interval, the connection is terminated.
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If the client fails to send a message (even if it’s a ping message) every minute
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(by default), the connection is terminated.
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.SS Temporary protocol submode
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.sp
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A temporary protocol submode begins with ConnectRequest message, to which the
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relay responds with either ResponseNotFound if the device the client it is after
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is not available, or with a SessionInvitation, which contains the unique session
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key which then can be used to establish a connection in session mode.
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.sp
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The connection is terminated immediately after that.
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.SS Example Exchange
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.sp
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Client A \- Permanent protocol submode
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Client B \- Temporary protocol submode
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.TS
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center;
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|l|l|l|l|.
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_
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T{
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#
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T} T{
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Client (A)
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T} T{
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Relay
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T} T{
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Client (B)
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T}
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_
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T{
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1
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T} T{
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JoinRelayRequest\->
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T} T{
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T} T{
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T}
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_
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T{
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2
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T} T{
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T} T{
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<\-ResponseSuccess
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T} T{
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T}
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_
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T{
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3
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T} T{
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Ping\->
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T} T{
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T} T{
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T}
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_
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T{
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4
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T} T{
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T} T{
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<\-Pong
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T} T{
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T}
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_
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T{
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5
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T} T{
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T} T{
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T} T{
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<\-ConnectRequest(A)
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T}
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_
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T{
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6
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T} T{
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T} T{
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SessionInvitation(A)\->
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T} T{
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T}
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_
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T{
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7
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T} T{
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T} T{
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<\-SessionInvitation(B)
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T} T{
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T}
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_
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T{
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8
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T} T{
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T} T{
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T} T{
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(Disconnects)
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T}
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_
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T{
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9
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T} T{
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Ping\->
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T} T{
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T} T{
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T}
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_
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T{
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10
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T} T{
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T} T{
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<\-Pong
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T} T{
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T}
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_
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T{
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11
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T} T{
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Ping\->
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T} T{
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T} T{
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T}
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_
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T{
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12
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T} T{
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T} T{
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<\-Pong
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T} T{
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T}
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_
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.TE
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.SH SESSION MODE
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.sp
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The first and only message the client sends in the session mode is the
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SessionInvitation message which contains the session key identifying which
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session you are trying to join. The relay responds with one of the following
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Response messages:
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.INDENT 0.0
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.IP 1. 3
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ResponseNotFound \- Session key is invalid
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.IP 2. 3
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ResponseAlreadyConnected \- Session is full (both sides already connected)
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.IP 3. 3
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ResponseSuccess \- You have successfully joined the session
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.UNINDENT
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.sp
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After the successful response, all the bytes written and received will be
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relayed between the two devices in the session directly.
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.SS Example Exchange
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.sp
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Client A \- Permanent protocol mode
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Client B \- Temporary protocol mode
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.TS
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center;
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|l|l|l|l|.
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_
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T{
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#
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T} T{
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Client (A)
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T} T{
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Relay
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T} T{
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Client (B)
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T}
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_
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T{
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1
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T} T{
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2016-04-01 07:33:42 +00:00
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JoinSessionRequest(A)\->
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T} T{
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T} T{
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T}
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_
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T{
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2
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T} T{
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T} T{
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<\-ResponseSuccess
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T} T{
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T}
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_
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T{
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3
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T} T{
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Data\->
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T} T{
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(Buffers data)
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T} T{
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T}
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_
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T{
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4
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T} T{
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Data\->
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T} T{
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(Buffers data)
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T} T{
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T}
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_
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T{
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5
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T} T{
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T} T{
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T} T{
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2016-04-01 07:33:42 +00:00
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<\-JoinSessionRequest(B)
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T}
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_
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T{
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6
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T} T{
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T} T{
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ResponseSuccess\->
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T} T{
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T}
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_
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T{
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7
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T} T{
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T} T{
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Relays data \->
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T} T{
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T}
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T{
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8
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T} T{
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T} T{
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Relays data \->
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T} T{
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T}
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_
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T{
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T} T{
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T} T{
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<\-Relays data
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T} T{
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<\-Data
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T}
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_
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.TE
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.SH MESSAGES
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.sp
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2016-05-17 12:02:44 +00:00
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All messages are preceded by a header message. Header message contains the
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magic value 0x9E79BC40, message type integer, and message length.
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.sp
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\fBWARNING:\fP
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.INDENT 0.0
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.INDENT 3.5
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Some messages have no content, apart from the implied header which allows
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us to identify what type of message it is.
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.UNINDENT
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.UNINDENT
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|
|
|
|
.SS Header structure
|
|
|
|
|
.INDENT 0.0
|
|
|
|
|
.INDENT 3.5
|
|
|
|
|
.sp
|
|
|
|
|
.nf
|
|
|
|
|
.ft C
|
|
|
|
|
0 1 2 3
|
|
|
|
|
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
|
|
|
|
|
+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+
|
|
|
|
|
| Magic |
|
|
|
|
|
+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+
|
|
|
|
|
| Message Type |
|
|
|
|
|
+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+
|
|
|
|
|
| Message Length |
|
|
|
|
|
+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct Header {
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned int Magic;
|
|
|
|
|
int MessageType;
|
|
|
|
|
int MessageLength;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
.ft P
|
|
|
|
|
.fi
|
|
|
|
|
.UNINDENT
|
|
|
|
|
.UNINDENT
|
|
|
|
|
.SS Ping message (Type = 0)
|
|
|
|
|
.INDENT 0.0
|
|
|
|
|
.INDENT 3.5
|
|
|
|
|
.sp
|
|
|
|
|
.nf
|
|
|
|
|
.ft C
|
|
|
|
|
0 1 2 3
|
|
|
|
|
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
|
|
|
|
|
+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct Ping {
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
.ft P
|
|
|
|
|
.fi
|
|
|
|
|
.UNINDENT
|
|
|
|
|
.UNINDENT
|
|
|
|
|
.SS Pong message (Type = 1)
|
|
|
|
|
.INDENT 0.0
|
|
|
|
|
.INDENT 3.5
|
|
|
|
|
.sp
|
|
|
|
|
.nf
|
|
|
|
|
.ft C
|
|
|
|
|
0 1 2 3
|
|
|
|
|
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
|
|
|
|
|
+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct Pong {
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
.ft P
|
|
|
|
|
.fi
|
|
|
|
|
.UNINDENT
|
|
|
|
|
.UNINDENT
|
|
|
|
|
.SS JoinRelayRequest message (Type = 2)
|
|
|
|
|
.INDENT 0.0
|
|
|
|
|
.INDENT 3.5
|
|
|
|
|
.sp
|
|
|
|
|
.nf
|
|
|
|
|
.ft C
|
|
|
|
|
0 1 2 3
|
|
|
|
|
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
|
|
|
|
|
+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct JoinRelayRequest {
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
.ft P
|
|
|
|
|
.fi
|
|
|
|
|
.UNINDENT
|
|
|
|
|
.UNINDENT
|
|
|
|
|
.SS JoinSessionRequest message (Type = 3)
|
|
|
|
|
.INDENT 0.0
|
|
|
|
|
.INDENT 3.5
|
|
|
|
|
.sp
|
|
|
|
|
.nf
|
|
|
|
|
.ft C
|
|
|
|
|
0 1 2 3
|
|
|
|
|
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
|
|
|
|
|
+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+
|
|
|
|
|
| Length of Key |
|
|
|
|
|
+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+
|
|
|
|
|
/ /
|
|
|
|
|
\e Key (variable length) \e
|
|
|
|
|
/ /
|
|
|
|
|
+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct JoinSessionRequest {
|
|
|
|
|
opaque Key<32>;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
.ft P
|
|
|
|
|
.fi
|
|
|
|
|
.UNINDENT
|
|
|
|
|
.UNINDENT
|
|
|
|
|
.INDENT 0.0
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
|
.B : Key
|
|
|
|
|
This is a unique random session key generated by the relay server. It is
|
|
|
|
|
used to identify which session you are trying to connect to.
|
|
|
|
|
.UNINDENT
|
|
|
|
|
.SS Response message (Type = 4)
|
|
|
|
|
.INDENT 0.0
|
|
|
|
|
.INDENT 3.5
|
|
|
|
|
.sp
|
|
|
|
|
.nf
|
|
|
|
|
.ft C
|
|
|
|
|
0 1 2 3
|
|
|
|
|
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
|
|
|
|
|
+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+
|
|
|
|
|
| Code |
|
|
|
|
|
+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+
|
|
|
|
|
| Length of Message |
|
|
|
|
|
+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+
|
|
|
|
|
/ /
|
|
|
|
|
\e Message (variable length) \e
|
|
|
|
|
/ /
|
|
|
|
|
+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct Response {
|
|
|
|
|
int Code;
|
|
|
|
|
string Message<>;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
.ft P
|
|
|
|
|
.fi
|
|
|
|
|
.UNINDENT
|
|
|
|
|
.UNINDENT
|
|
|
|
|
.INDENT 0.0
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
|
.B : Code
|
|
|
|
|
An integer representing the status code.
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
|
.B : Message
|
|
|
|
|
Message associated with the code.
|
|
|
|
|
.UNINDENT
|
|
|
|
|
.SS ConnectRequest message (Type = 5)
|
|
|
|
|
.INDENT 0.0
|
|
|
|
|
.INDENT 3.5
|
|
|
|
|
.sp
|
|
|
|
|
.nf
|
|
|
|
|
.ft C
|
|
|
|
|
0 1 2 3
|
|
|
|
|
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
|
|
|
|
|
+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+
|
|
|
|
|
| Length of ID |
|
|
|
|
|
+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+
|
|
|
|
|
/ /
|
|
|
|
|
\e ID (variable length) \e
|
|
|
|
|
/ /
|
|
|
|
|
+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct ConnectRequest {
|
|
|
|
|
opaque ID<32>;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
.ft P
|
|
|
|
|
.fi
|
|
|
|
|
.UNINDENT
|
|
|
|
|
.UNINDENT
|
|
|
|
|
.INDENT 0.0
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
|
.B : ID
|
|
|
|
|
Device ID to which the client would like to connect.
|
|
|
|
|
.UNINDENT
|
|
|
|
|
.SS SessionInvitation message (Type = 6)
|
|
|
|
|
.INDENT 0.0
|
|
|
|
|
.INDENT 3.5
|
|
|
|
|
.sp
|
|
|
|
|
.nf
|
|
|
|
|
.ft C
|
|
|
|
|
0 1 2 3
|
|
|
|
|
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
|
|
|
|
|
+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+
|
|
|
|
|
| Length of From |
|
|
|
|
|
+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+
|
|
|
|
|
/ /
|
|
|
|
|
\e From (variable length) \e
|
|
|
|
|
/ /
|
|
|
|
|
+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+
|
|
|
|
|
| Length of Key |
|
|
|
|
|
+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+
|
|
|
|
|
/ /
|
|
|
|
|
\e Key (variable length) \e
|
|
|
|
|
/ /
|
|
|
|
|
+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+
|
|
|
|
|
| Length of Address |
|
|
|
|
|
+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+
|
|
|
|
|
/ /
|
|
|
|
|
\e Address (variable length) \e
|
|
|
|
|
/ /
|
|
|
|
|
+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+
|
|
|
|
|
| 0x0000 | Port |
|
|
|
|
|
+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+
|
|
|
|
|
| Server Socket (V=0 or 1) |V|
|
|
|
|
|
+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+\-+
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct SessionInvitation {
|
|
|
|
|
opaque From<32>;
|
|
|
|
|
opaque Key<32>;
|
|
|
|
|
opaque Address<32>;
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned int Port;
|
|
|
|
|
bool ServerSocket;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
.ft P
|
|
|
|
|
.fi
|
|
|
|
|
.UNINDENT
|
|
|
|
|
.UNINDENT
|
|
|
|
|
.INDENT 0.0
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
|
.B : From
|
|
|
|
|
Device ID identifying who you will be connecting with.
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
|
.B : Key
|
|
|
|
|
A unique random session key generated by the relay server. It is used to
|
|
|
|
|
identify which session you are trying to connect to.
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
|
.B : Address
|
|
|
|
|
An optional IP address on which the relay server is expecting you to
|
|
|
|
|
connect, in order to start a connection in session mode.
|
2017-11-29 06:45:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Empty/all zero IP should be replaced with the relay’s public IP address that
|
2015-12-20 09:05:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
was used when establishing the protocol mode connection.
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
|
.B : Port
|
|
|
|
|
An optional port on which the relay server is expecting you to connect,
|
|
|
|
|
in order to start a connection in session mode.
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
|
.B : Server Socket
|
|
|
|
|
Because both sides connecting to the relay use the client side of the socket,
|
|
|
|
|
and some protocols behave differently depending if the connection starts on
|
|
|
|
|
the server side or the client side, this boolean indicates which side of the
|
2017-11-29 06:45:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
connection this client should assume it’s getting. The value is inverted in
|
2015-12-20 09:05:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
the invitation which is sent to the other device, so that there is always
|
|
|
|
|
one client socket, and one server socket.
|
|
|
|
|
.UNINDENT
|
|
|
|
|
.SH HOW SYNCTHING USES RELAYS, AND GENERAL SECURITY
|
|
|
|
|
.sp
|
|
|
|
|
In the case of Syncthing and BEP, when two devices connect via relay, they
|
2017-11-29 06:45:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
start their standard TLS connection encapsulated within the relay’s plain\-text
|
2015-12-20 09:05:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
session connection, effectively upgrading the plain\-text connection to a TLS
|
|
|
|
|
connection.
|
|
|
|
|
.sp
|
|
|
|
|
Even though the relay could be used for man\-in\-the\-middle attack, using TLS
|
|
|
|
|
at the application/BEP level ensures that all the traffic is safely encrypted,
|
|
|
|
|
and is completely meaningless to the relay. Furthermore, the secure suite of
|
|
|
|
|
ciphers used by BEP provides forward secrecy, meaning that even if the relay
|
|
|
|
|
did capture all the traffic, and even if the attacker did get their hands on the
|
|
|
|
|
device keys, they would still not be able to recover/decrypt any traffic which
|
|
|
|
|
was transported via the relay.
|
|
|
|
|
.sp
|
2016-11-29 10:56:02 +00:00
|
|
|
|
After establishing a relay session, Syncthing looks at the SessionInvitation
|
2015-12-20 09:05:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
message, and depending which side it has received, wraps the raw socket in
|
|
|
|
|
either a TLS client socket or a TLS server socket depending on the ServerSocket
|
|
|
|
|
boolean value in the SessionInvitation, and starts the TLS handshake.
|
|
|
|
|
.sp
|
2016-11-29 10:56:02 +00:00
|
|
|
|
From that point onwards it functions exactly the same way as if Syncthing was
|
2015-12-20 09:05:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
establishing a direct connection with the other device over the internet,
|
|
|
|
|
performing device ID validation, and full TLS encryption, and provides the same
|
|
|
|
|
security properties as it would provide when connecting over the internet.
|
|
|
|
|
.SH EXAMPLES OF STRONG CIPHER SUITES
|
|
|
|
|
.TS
|
|
|
|
|
center;
|
|
|
|
|
|l|l|l|.
|
|
|
|
|
_
|
|
|
|
|
T{
|
|
|
|
|
ID
|
|
|
|
|
T} T{
|
|
|
|
|
Name
|
|
|
|
|
T} T{
|
|
|
|
|
Description
|
|
|
|
|
T}
|
|
|
|
|
_
|
|
|
|
|
T{
|
|
|
|
|
0x009F
|
|
|
|
|
T} T{
|
|
|
|
|
DHE\-RSA\-AES256\-GCM\-SHA384
|
|
|
|
|
T} T{
|
|
|
|
|
TLSv1.2 DH RSA AESGCM(256) AEAD
|
|
|
|
|
T}
|
|
|
|
|
_
|
|
|
|
|
T{
|
|
|
|
|
0x006B
|
|
|
|
|
T} T{
|
|
|
|
|
DHE\-RSA\-AES256\-SHA256
|
|
|
|
|
T} T{
|
|
|
|
|
TLSv1.2 DH RSA AES(256) SHA256
|
|
|
|
|
T}
|
|
|
|
|
_
|
|
|
|
|
T{
|
|
|
|
|
0xC030
|
|
|
|
|
T} T{
|
|
|
|
|
ECDHE\-RSA\-AES256\-GCM\-SHA384
|
|
|
|
|
T} T{
|
|
|
|
|
TLSv1.2 ECDH RSA AESGCM(256) AEAD
|
|
|
|
|
T}
|
|
|
|
|
_
|
|
|
|
|
T{
|
|
|
|
|
0xC028
|
|
|
|
|
T} T{
|
|
|
|
|
ECDHE\-RSA\-AES256\-SHA384
|
|
|
|
|
T} T{
|
|
|
|
|
TLSv1.2 ECDH RSA AES(256) SHA384
|
|
|
|
|
T}
|
|
|
|
|
_
|
|
|
|
|
T{
|
|
|
|
|
0x009E
|
|
|
|
|
T} T{
|
|
|
|
|
DHE\-RSA\-AES128\-GCM\-SHA256
|
|
|
|
|
T} T{
|
|
|
|
|
TLSv1.2 DH RSA AESGCM(128) AEAD
|
|
|
|
|
T}
|
|
|
|
|
_
|
|
|
|
|
T{
|
|
|
|
|
0x0067
|
|
|
|
|
T} T{
|
|
|
|
|
DHE\-RSA\-AES128\-SHA256
|
|
|
|
|
T} T{
|
|
|
|
|
TLSv1.2 DH RSA AES(128) SHA256
|
|
|
|
|
T}
|
|
|
|
|
_
|
|
|
|
|
T{
|
|
|
|
|
0xC02F
|
|
|
|
|
T} T{
|
|
|
|
|
ECDHE\-RSA\-AES128\-GCM\-SHA256
|
|
|
|
|
T} T{
|
|
|
|
|
TLSv1.2 ECDH RSA AESGCM(128) AEAD
|
|
|
|
|
T}
|
|
|
|
|
_
|
|
|
|
|
T{
|
|
|
|
|
0xC027
|
|
|
|
|
T} T{
|
|
|
|
|
ECDHE\-RSA\-AES128\-SHA256
|
|
|
|
|
T} T{
|
|
|
|
|
TLSv1.2 ECDH RSA AES(128) SHA256
|
|
|
|
|
T}
|
|
|
|
|
_
|
|
|
|
|
.TE
|
|
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|
.SH AUTHOR
|
|
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|
The Syncthing Authors
|
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|
.SH COPYRIGHT
|
2018-02-07 06:45:17 +00:00
|
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|
2014-2018, The Syncthing Authors
|
2015-12-20 09:05:17 +00:00
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.\" Generated by docutils manpage writer.
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.
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