* Trigger connection loop on config device addition (fixes#7600)
* Also check for device address equality
* Move EqualStrings from api_test to utils, and use in connections/service.go
* Make sure CommitConfiguration cannot block due on the deviceAddressesChanged channel
* Update lib/connections/service.go
Co-authored-by: Jakob Borg <jakob@kastelo.net>
This makes us use TLS 1.3+ on sync connections by default. A new option
`insecureAllowOldTLSVersions` exists to allow communication with TLS
1.2-only clients (roughly Syncthing 1.2.2 and older). Even with that
option set you get a slightly simplified setup, with the cipher suite
order fixed instead of auto detected.
No longer hide the web UI controls for the new untrusted/encrypted
device feature. Testing hasn't been very widespread, but there has been
some and quite a few bugs have been caught and fixed. I believe its time
to not hide it anymore, and cautiously recommend usage. E.g. mention
that the feature hasn't been widely used yet and anyone using it is an
early adopter, but drop the bit about not using it with production data.
We can maybe stress the need for backups in general and especially
using this.
There was a logic mistake, so the limit in question wasn't used. On my
macOS this doesn't seem to matter, the hard limit returned is 2^63-1 and
setting the soft limit to that works. However I'm assuming that's not
the case for older macOSes since it was so nicely documented, so we
should still have this working. (10240 FDs should be enough for
anybody.)
This is a mostly pointless change to make security scanners and static
analysis tools happy, as they all hate seeing md5. None of our md5 uses
were security relevant, but still. Only visible effect of this change is
that our temp file names for very long file names become slightly longer
than they were previously...
This adds a couple of dummy asset files protected by the "noassets"
build tag. The purpose is that it should be possible for, for example,
CI tools and static analysis things to compile and analyze the source
tree without our custom asset generation step. Also makes `go test -tags
noassets ./...` work without building assets first.
This truncates times meant for API consumption to second precision,
where fractions won't typically matter or add any value. Exception to
this is timestamps on logs and events, and of course I'm not touching
things like file metadata.
I'm not 100% certain this is an exhaustive change, but it's the things I
found by grepping and following the breadcrumbs from lib/api...
I also considered general-but-ugly solutions, like having the API
serializer itself do reflection magic or even regexps on returned
objects, but decided against it because aurgh...
This loosens the ‘is this localhost?’ check to include *.localhost host
names.
This allows for clearer (hence better) names to be used in browsers,
e.g. when accessing a remote syncthing instance ‘foo’ using a ssh port
forward, one can use foo.localhost to remind oneself which one is which.
💡 Without these changes, Syncthing shows a ‘Host check error’ when
pointing a browser at http://foo.localhost/, and with these changes, the
interface loads as usual.
The .localhost top level domain is a reserved top-level domain (RFC 2606):
> The ".localhost" TLD has traditionally been statically defined in
> host DNS implementations as having an A record pointing to the
> loop back IP address and is reserved for such use. Any other use
> would conflict with widely deployed code which assumes this use.
> – https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2606
As Wikipedia puts it:
> This allows the use of these names for either documentation purposes
or in local testing scenarios. – https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/.localhost
On Linux systems, systemd-resolved resolves *.localhost, on purpose:
https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd-resolved.service.html
See also #4815, #4816.
An untrusted device will receive padded info for small blocks, and hence
sometimes request a larger block than actually exists on disk.
Previously we let this pass because we didn't have a hash to compare to
in that case and we ignored the EOF error based on that.
Now the untrusted device does pass an encrypted hash that we decrypt and
verify. This means we can't check for len(hash)==0 any more, but on the
other hand we do have a valid hash we can apply to the data we actually
read. If it matches then we don't need to worry about the read
supposedly being a bit short.
