When cap(permanentRelays) >= len(permanentRelays) + len(knownRelays),
append(permanentRelays, knownRelays...)
returns a slice of the array underlying permanentRelays. The subsequent
rand.Shuffle then mixes the permanent and known relays. Sequential
requests may cause strelaypoolsrv to forget its permanent relays. Worse,
concurrent requests may cause shuffling of the same slice on multiple
processors concurrently.
Co-authored-by: greatroar <@>
Storing assets as []byte requires every compiled-in asset to be copied
into writable memory at program startup. That currently takes up 1.6MB
per syncthing process. Strings stay in the RODATA section and should be
shared between processes running the same binary.
Successful LRU cache lookups modify the cache's recency list, so
RWMutex.RLock isn't enough protection.
Secondarily, multiple concurrent lookups with the same key should not
create separate rate limiters, so release the lock only when presence
of the key in the cache has been ascertained.
Co-authored-by: greatroar <@>
- In the few places where we wrap errors, use the new Go 1.13 "%w"
construction instead of %s or %v.
- Where we create errors with constant strings, consistently use
errors.New and not fmt.Errorf.
- Remove capitalization from errors in the few places where we had that.
This adds a certificate lifetime parameter to our certificate generation
and hard codes it to twenty years in some uninteresting places. In the
main binary there are a couple of constants but it results in twenty
years for the device certificate and 820 days for the HTTPS one. 820 is
less than the 825 maximum Apple allows nowadays.
This also means we must be prepared for certificates to expire, so I add
some handling for that and generate a new certificate when needed. For
self signed certificates we regenerate a month ahead of time. For other
certificates we leave well enough alone.
This changes the TLS and certificate handling in a few ways:
- We always use TLS 1.2, both for sync connections (as previously) and
the GUI/REST/discovery stuff. This is a tightening of the requirements
on the GUI. AS far as I can tell from caniusethis.com every browser from
2013 and forward supports TLS 1.2, so I think we should be fine.
- We always greate ECDSA certificates. Previously we'd create
ECDSA-with-RSA certificates for sync connections and pure RSA
certificates for the web stuff. The new default is more modern and the
same everywhere. These certificates are OK in TLS 1.2.
- We use the Go CPU detection stuff to choose the cipher suites to use,
indirectly. The TLS package uses CPU capabilities probing to select
either AES-GCM (fast if we have AES-NI) or ChaCha20 (faster if we
don't). These CPU detection things aren't exported though, so the tlsutil
package now does a quick TLS handshake with itself as part of init().
If the chosen cipher suite was AES-GCM we prioritize that, otherwise we
prefer ChaCha20. Some might call this ugly. I think it's awesome.
The current 500 "test failed" looks and sounds like a problem in the
relay pool server, while it actually indicates a problem on the
announcing side. Instead use 400 "connection test failed" to indicate
that the request was bad and what was the test.
