With this change, the behavior is as follows:
- SIGTERM / SIGINT: Exit cleanly (exit code 0)
- SIGHUP: Restart
This is the case both when hitting the monitor process or the inner
process, or if running with NORESTART (but then we won't restart,
obviously, just exit with code exitRestarting).
It enables "pkill -HUP syncthing" to do the right thing to restart all
Syncthings on package upgrade, for example.
Previously, when unmarshing the SOAP error code data we would overwrite
the original err, typically with null since the parsing of the error
code information succeeds. If we don't have a upnp 725 error, we would fall
back to returning null or no error. This broke our upnp error handling
logic for AddPortMappings as it would think it succeeds if it gets a 718
permission error.
Also fixes what I think migh thave been a bug where we did not use the
proxy for usage reports. And removes the BuildEnv field that we don't
need any more.
This is the same issue as #2014/#2062. Bootstrap doesn't like having two dialogs
open at once: it marks the body has having no dialogs open when the first dialog
is closed, regardless of whether the second dialog is still open.
This means that scrolling doesn't happen properly, and the user cannot
scroll to the dialog's 'close' button.
Work around this by making sure the first dialog (the settings page) is fully closed
before the second dialog (usage preview) is opened.
This replaces the current 3072 bit RSA certificates with 384 bit ECDSA
certificates. The advantage is these certificates are smaller and
essentially instantaneous to generate. According to RFC4492 (ECC Cipher
Suites for TLS), Table 1: Comparable Key Sizes, ECC has comparable
strength to 3072 bit RSA at 283 bits - so we exceed that.
There is no compatibility issue with existing Syncthing code - this is
verified by the integration test ("h2" instance has the new
certificate).
There are browsers out there that don't understand ECC certificates yet,
although I think they're dying out. In the meantime, I've retained the
RSA code for the HTTPS certificate, but pulled it down to 2048 bits. I
don't think a higher security level there is motivated, is this matches
current industry standard for HTTPS certificates.
